主題：Club Dynamics and Non-Rival Resources俱樂(lè)部的形成與演變
主講人：山東大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院 鄭捷教授
主持人：經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院副院長(zhǎng) 鄒紅教授
時(shí)間：3月31日15:15-16:15
地點(diǎn)：柳林校區(qū)誠(chéng)正樓1600
主辦單位：經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院 科研處
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
鄭捷，山東大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院教授、博士生導(dǎo)師；清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)學(xué)士、碩士，美國(guó)華盛頓大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)碩士、博士。山東大學(xué)特聘教授，山東大學(xué)理論與實(shí)驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究中心（CREATE）主任。國(guó)家級(jí)人才計(jì)劃入選者，山東省“泰山學(xué)者計(jì)劃”特聘專(zhuān)家；國(guó)際學(xué)術(shù)期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副主編、Research in Economics副主編，擔(dān)任多份SSCI/SCI期刊客座主編。研究領(lǐng)域包括信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、實(shí)驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，主持過(guò)多項(xiàng)國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目（結(jié)題連續(xù)獲“特優(yōu)”評(píng)價(jià)），并多次在學(xué)術(shù)會(huì)議上做主旨演講與專(zhuān)題報(bào)告。研究工作發(fā)表于《經(jīng)濟(jì)研究》、American Economic Review(Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等國(guó)內(nèi)外經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、管理學(xué)、自然科學(xué)各領(lǐng)域的知名期刊。擔(dān)任中國(guó)信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會(huì)理事會(huì)常務(wù)理事、中國(guó)運(yùn)籌學(xué)會(huì)博弈論分會(huì)常務(wù)理事、中國(guó)行為與實(shí)驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)論壇聯(lián)合秘書(shū)長(zhǎng)、中國(guó)微觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)理論論壇學(xué)術(shù)委員會(huì)委員、中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)年會(huì)微觀(guān)理論與行為經(jīng)濟(jì)專(zhuān)業(yè)委員會(huì)委員、國(guó)際行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)促進(jìn)學(xué)會(huì)理事等學(xué)術(shù)職務(wù)。
內(nèi)容提要:
This lecture introduces a dynamic Club Goods Game in which each player can include and/or exclude other players into their personal club, and potentially make contributions to their club which will benefit all their club members. To understand the reciprocity dynamics behind club membership and contributions, we implement four experimental treatments which vary based on whether club members can be invited, excluded, both or neither. We find that contributions are highest, and club size is most stable, under the most flexible membership determination procedure. The ability to permanently exclude members from one’s club induces the greatest reciprocal behavior among players, which is a key determinant of contributions. In addition, we examine how prior experience in the Club Goods Game affects subsequent contributions in a standard Public Goods Game. Experience in the flexible membership Club Goods Game treatment leads to the highest contributions in the Public Goods game, while fully inflexible membership produces the lowest contributions. Altogether, our study helps pinpoint the group and individual level dynamics for effective provision of non-rival resources.
本次講座介紹了一個(gè)動(dòng)態(tài)的俱樂(lè)部物品博弈，在該博弈中，每位參與者可以邀請(qǐng)或排除其他玩家加入其個(gè)人俱樂(lè)部，并可能為其俱樂(lè)部作出貢獻(xiàn)，使所有俱樂(lè)部成員受益。為了理解俱樂(lè)部成員資格與貢獻(xiàn)行為背后的互惠動(dòng)態(tài)機(jī)制，研究團(tuán)隊(duì)設(shè)計(jì)了四種實(shí)驗(yàn)處理方案，其區(qū)別在于俱樂(lè)部成員是否可以被邀請(qǐng)、被排除、兩者兼具或均不可行。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在最靈活的成員資格確定機(jī)制下，參與者的貢獻(xiàn)水平最高且俱樂(lè)部規(guī)模最為穩(wěn)定。永久排除成員的能力會(huì)引發(fā)參與者之間最強(qiáng)的互惠行為，這是決定貢獻(xiàn)水平的關(guān)鍵因素。此外，研究團(tuán)隊(duì)考察了俱樂(lè)部物品博弈的先前經(jīng)驗(yàn)如何影響后續(xù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)公共物品博弈中的貢獻(xiàn)行為。在靈活的成員資格俱樂(lè)部物品博弈中獲得經(jīng)驗(yàn)的參與者，在后續(xù)公共物品博弈中表現(xiàn)出最高的貢獻(xiàn)水平；而完全固定的成員資格機(jī)制則導(dǎo)致最低的貢獻(xiàn)水平?？傮w而言，本研究有助于揭示群體和個(gè)體層面的動(dòng)態(tài)機(jī)制，為有效供給非競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性資源提供理論支持。
