主題：Inflation and Debt Rollover under Low Interest Rates 低利率下的通貨膨脹與債務(wù)再融資
主講人：美國(guó)波士頓大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)系 苗建軍教授
主持人：中國(guó)金融研究院 張博副教授
時(shí)間：1月8日9:30-11:00
地點(diǎn)：柳林校區(qū)格致樓618A
主辦單位：金融學(xué)院、中國(guó)金融研究院 科研處
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
苗建軍，現(xiàn)任美國(guó)波士頓大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)系終身教授，兼任浙江大學(xué)和中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)兼職教授。他的研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)榕菽捅辣P(pán)的宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)意義、不確定下決策理論與應(yīng)用、金融與實(shí)際摩擦的宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、動(dòng)態(tài)契約、連續(xù)時(shí)間金融。苗建軍教授擔(dān)任Annals of Economics and Finance、Economic Theory、Journal of Mathematical Economics以及Macroeconomic Dynamics等國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)金融期刊的副主編。自2003 年以來(lái)，苗建軍教授已在A(yíng)merican Economic Review、American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics、Econometrica、International Economic Review、Journal of Economic Theory、Journal of Finance、Journal of Financial Economics、Journal of Monetary Economics、Review of Financial Studies以及Theoretical Economics等國(guó)際頂尖金融學(xué)和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)期刊上發(fā)表論文30余篇。
內(nèi)容提要：
This lecture constructs a New Keynesian model with overlapping generations to study the impact of temporary and permanent increases in fiscal deficits financed by debt rollover policy when interest rates are lower than economic growth rates. This lecture will show that the debt rollover policy is feasible in the monetary regime, but leads to very slow-moving debt. For a temporary increase in fiscal deficits, this policy generates persistent inflation; while for a permanent increase, it leads to persistent disinflation. From the perspective of social welfare, in terms of financing a temporary increase in fiscal deficits, the debt rollover policy dominates the conventional fiscal rule; but if the increase is permanent, the debt rollover policy is dominated.
本次講座構(gòu)建了一個(gè)具有世代交疊特征的新凱恩斯主義模型，用于研究在利率低于經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率的情況下，通過(guò)債務(wù)展期政策為財(cái)政赤字的臨時(shí)性與永久性增加提供資金時(shí)所產(chǎn)生的影響。本次講座將表明，在貨幣制度下債務(wù)展期政策是可行的，但會(huì)導(dǎo)致債務(wù)的變動(dòng)極為緩慢。對(duì)于財(cái)政赤字的臨時(shí)性增加而言，該政策會(huì)引發(fā)持續(xù)的通貨膨脹；而對(duì)于永久性增加，它則會(huì)導(dǎo)致持續(xù)的通貨緊縮。從社會(huì)福利的角度來(lái)看，就為財(cái)政赤字的臨時(shí)性增加提供資金而言，債務(wù)展期政策優(yōu)于傳統(tǒng)的財(cái)政規(guī)則；但如果赤字增加是永久性的，債務(wù)展期政策則處于劣勢(shì)。
