主題：A Tale of Two Judgments: The Joint Effect of CEO Gender and Explanation Plausibility on Retail Investors and Analysts兩種評(píng)判：首席執(zhí)行官性別和解釋可信度對(duì)散戶(hù)投資者和分析師的共同影響
主講人：上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院副院長(zhǎng) 周波副教授
主持人：會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院院長(zhǎng)助理 陳磊教授
時(shí)間：3月12日10:00-11:30
地點(diǎn)：柳林校區(qū)誠(chéng)正樓650會(huì)議室
主辦單位：會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院 科研處
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
周波，上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院副院長(zhǎng)，副教授，博士生導(dǎo)師，南洋理工大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)博士，國(guó)家高層次人才計(jì)劃入選者。研究領(lǐng)域聚焦于會(huì)計(jì)信息提供者、使用者、資本市場(chǎng)中介的判斷與決策過(guò)程，以及制度與環(huán)境特征如何影響這些判斷與決策，研究成果發(fā)表于A(yíng)ccounting Review、Journal of Accounting Research、《管理世界》《會(huì)計(jì)研究》等國(guó)內(nèi)外權(quán)威期刊。
內(nèi)容提要：
Retail investors and analysts are both important market participants. This lecture investigates how CEO gender affects their reactions to corporate performance attributions. Drawing on role congruity theory, recent accounting research suggests that female CEOs and analysts are penalized for behaviors perceived as incongruent with traditional gender roles. This lecture extends prior research by exploring the boundary conditions under which role congruity theory applies, employing two experiments that manipulate Explanation Plausibility (plausible versus implausible) and CEO Gender (male versus female). Experiment 1 reveals that retail investors, who are socially more distant from CEOs, penalize male CEOs more harshly for providing implausible explanations, whereas female CEOs do not face similar penalties. These findings align with double standard theory. Experiment 2 demonstrates that analysts, who are socially more proximate to CEOs, assign higher risk assessments to female CEOs compared to male CEOs even when plausible explanations are offered. These results highlight distinct forms of gender bias among different market participants and provide critical insights into how gender stereotypes shape investment-related judgments. This lecture have significant implications for investors, corporate communication strategies, and market regulators, offering guidance on addressing gender-based biases in financial markets.
散戶(hù)投資者和分析師都是重要的市場(chǎng)參與者。本次講座分享的研究主要是首席執(zhí)行官的性別如何影響他們對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)歸因的反應(yīng)。根據(jù)角色一致性理論，最近的會(huì)計(jì)研究表明，女性首席執(zhí)行官和分析師會(huì)因?yàn)楸徽J(rèn)為與傳統(tǒng)性別角色不一致的行為而受到懲罰。本次講座擴(kuò)展了之前的研究，采用了兩個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)來(lái)操縱解釋可信度（可信與不可信）和首席執(zhí)行官性別（男性與女性），從而探索角色一致性理論適用的邊界條件。實(shí)驗(yàn)1顯示，與首席執(zhí)行官社會(huì)關(guān)系更疏遠(yuǎn)的散戶(hù)投資者會(huì)對(duì)提供不可信解釋的男性首席執(zhí)行官進(jìn)行更嚴(yán)厲的懲罰，而女性首席執(zhí)行官則不會(huì)面臨類(lèi)似的懲罰。這些發(fā)現(xiàn)符合雙重標(biāo)準(zhǔn)理論。實(shí)驗(yàn)2表明，與首席執(zhí)行官更親近的分析師對(duì)女性首席執(zhí)行官的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估要高于男性首席執(zhí)行官，即使在提供了可信解釋的情況下也是如此。這些結(jié)果凸顯了不同市場(chǎng)參與者之間不同形式的性別偏見(jiàn)，并提供了關(guān)于性別刻板印象如何影響投資相關(guān)判斷的重要見(jiàn)解。本次講座對(duì)投資者、企業(yè)溝通策略和市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)具有重要意義，為解決金融市場(chǎng)中的性別偏見(jiàn)提供一些建議。
