光華講壇——社會(huì)名流與企業(yè)家論壇第6606期
主題：Optimal subsidy beneficiaries to promote electric vehicle adoption促進(jìn)電動(dòng)汽車(chē)普及的最優(yōu)補(bǔ)貼對(duì)象
主講人：蘇州大學(xué) 馮博教授
主持人：管理科學(xué)與工程學(xué)院 肖輝教授
時(shí)間：10月25日 9:30-11:30
舉辦地點(diǎn)：騰訊會(huì)議ID:460-579-9016
主辦單位：管理科學(xué)與工程學(xué)院 科研處
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
馮博，蘇州大學(xué)商學(xué)院院長(zhǎng)、教授、博導(dǎo)。國(guó)家級(jí)領(lǐng)軍人才，國(guó)家優(yōu)秀青年基金獲得者。兼任江蘇省新時(shí)代民營(yíng)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院院長(zhǎng)和東吳資本市場(chǎng)研究院院長(zhǎng)，擔(dān)任POM-China戰(zhàn)略咨詢(xún)委員會(huì)委員、中國(guó)管理科學(xué)與工程學(xué)會(huì)常務(wù)理事等多個(gè)學(xué)術(shù)任職。
內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介：
Electric vehicles (EVs) are increasingly approved as a disruptive technology that can limit oil consumption and reduce carbon emissions. Recognizing this, governments worldwide are continuously offering subsidies to promote EV adoption. However, the issue of identifying optimal beneficiaries remains inadequately addressed due to some critical though unexplored aspects. One of the conspicuously missing aspects is whether channel structures make a difference in selecting optimal beneficiaries. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore whom to subsidize (i.e., consumers, manufacturers, or both) to better realize the intended objectives under varying distribution channels of EVs (from retail channels to direct channels). Our analysis reveals that optimal beneficiaries to reduce consumer expenditure are largely affected by the channel structure while relying on the manufacturer’s R&D efficiency and consumers’ expectation for government subsidy. We also extend our analysis to show that when beneficiaries are well-selected, the direct channel, in most cases, outperforms the retail channel in terms of consumer expenditure and manufacturer’s R&D level. As such, our analysis provides governors with advanced guidelines to select subsidy beneficiaries and compelling evidence to encourage direct selling.
電動(dòng)汽車(chē)(EV)作為一項(xiàng)能夠限制石油消耗和減少碳排放的顛覆性技術(shù)，越來(lái)越受到人們的認(rèn)可。認(rèn)識(shí)到這一點(diǎn)，世界各國(guó)政府不斷提供補(bǔ)貼，以促進(jìn)電動(dòng)汽車(chē)的普及。然而，由于一些關(guān)鍵但尚未探索的方面，確定最佳受益者的問(wèn)題仍然沒(méi)有得到充分解決。其中一個(gè)明顯缺失的方面是，渠道結(jié)構(gòu)在選擇最佳受益者方面是否會(huì)產(chǎn)生影響。本文建立了一個(gè)博弈論模型，探討在不同的電動(dòng)汽車(chē)分銷(xiāo)渠道(從零售渠道到直銷(xiāo)渠道)下，補(bǔ)貼誰(shuí)(即消費(fèi)者、制造商或兩者)才能更好地實(shí)現(xiàn)預(yù)期目標(biāo)。分析表明，渠道結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)消費(fèi)者支出減少的最優(yōu)受益者影響較大，同時(shí)依賴(lài)于制造商的研發(fā)效率和消費(fèi)者對(duì)政府補(bǔ)貼的期望。我們還擴(kuò)展了我們的分析，表明當(dāng)受益者被精心選擇時(shí)，在大多數(shù)情況下，直接渠道在消費(fèi)者支出和制造商的研發(fā)水平方面優(yōu)于零售渠道。因此，我們的分析為州長(zhǎng)選擇補(bǔ)貼受益人提供了先進(jìn)的指導(dǎo)方針，并為鼓勵(lì)直銷(xiāo)提供了令人信服的證據(jù)。
